Toward a functional failure analysis method of identifying and mitigating spurious system emissions in a system of systems by Van Bossuyt, Douglas L. & Arlitt, Ryan M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2019
Toward a functional failure analysis method of
identifying and mitigating spurious system
emissions in a system of systems
Van Bossuyt, Douglas L.; Arlitt, Ryan M.
ASME
Van Bossuyt, Douglas L., and Ryan M. Arlitt. "Toward a functional failure analysis
method of identifying and mitigating spurious system emissions in a system of
systems." International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers
and Information in Engineering Conference. Vol. 59179. American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/65179
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
TOWARD A FUNCTIONAL FAILURE ANALYSIS METHOD OF IDENTIFYING AND
MITIGATING SPURIOUS SYSTEM EMISSIONS IN A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS






Department of Mechanical Engineering
Technical University of Denmark




Increasingly tight coupling and heavy connectedness in sys-
tems of systems (SoS) presents new problems for systems design-
ers and engineers. While the failure of one system within a SoS
may produce little collateral damage beyond a loss in SoS ca-
pability, a highly interconnected SoS can experience significant
damage when one member system fails in an unanticipated way.
It is therefore important to develop systems that are ”good neigh-
bors” with the other systems in a SoS by failing in ways that do
not further degrade a SoS’s ability to complete its mission.
This paper presents a method to (1) analyze a system for
potential spurious emissions and (2) choose mitigation strate-
gies that provide the best return on investment for the SoS. The
method is suited for use during the system architecture phase of
the system design process. A functional and flow approach to an-
alyzing spurious emissions and developing mitigation strategies
is used in the method. Use of the method may result in a system
that causes less SoS damage during a failure event.
INTRODUCTION
As the field of system of systems (SoS) engineering has de-
veloped over the last several years, an emerging area of interest
is how well member systems behave with other systems. Many
systems architects and systems engineers desire systems that are
”good neighbors” to other systems within the SoS in both nom-
∗Address all correspondence to this author.
inal operation and in degraded or failed system states. While
industry-standard failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques are currently be-
ing used to help design systems that are ”good neighbors,” there
is a need for a more nuanced and robust approach to analyzing
the effects that one system operating in a degraded or failed state
has on its SoS neighbors.
We care as system designers and engineers to develop sys-
tems that do not damage systems around them when they fail
because preventing such damaging events helps to ensure a SoS
achieves its goals and mission objectives. This is becoming es-
pecially important as SoS become more tightly connected, such
as the growth in the Internet of Things (IoT) and in digital inter-
operability initiatives within the Department of Defense (DoD).
The systems that we design need to fail gracefully and contain
their failure events to minimize damage to the SoS. For instance,
enclosing turbo-machinery in shrouds to prevent shrapnel from a
rapid unexpected fan disk deconstruction event spraying across
a factory floor is a common-sense measure that can save signifi-
cant damage to other equipment and potentially save the lives of
nearby personnel.
SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we present a conceptual system design method
– appropriate for the early system architecture phase of the sys-
tems engineering process – to identify and mitigate potential spu-
rious system emissions in the form of failure flows. The method
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uses functional modeling and functional abstraction, and proba-
bilistic failure analysis techniques to identify potential spurious
failure flow emissions. In this context, a spurious failure flow
emission is a flow emitted by a function that (1) is not present
in nominal operation and (2) leaves the system boundary. The
potential spurious emissions are identified on a per-function ba-
sis and with special attention paid to potential low probability
but high consequence events. The method further balances sys-
tem requirements and constraints with implementing mitigation
strategies in order to protect the large system of systems.
The method presented here specifically is intended to be
used before large system architectural decisions have been made
and when there is still significant flexibility in the fundamental
functional design of the system. Other methods that examine
spurious failure flow emissions generally do so after functional
architectures have been solidified and component solutions to
functions have been identified. Mitigation strategies that result
from analysis performed later in the systems engineering and
design processes often result in mitigation subsystems that are
afterthoughts. We instead present a method that allows spuri-
ous system emissions mitigation strategies to be integrated dur-
ing and implemented from the very earliest functional modeling
efforts of a new system that is to join a SoS.
The method is intended to complement existing failure anal-
ysis techniques discussed in subsequent sections. However, it is
not intended to be a direct add-on to existing techniques such as
FMEA or PRA. The method most closely integrates with other
existing functional failure analysis techniques.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Several areas of related research and professional practice
are of importance to the research presented in this paper. This
section reviews relevant literature on the systems engineering
and architecture process, functional modeling, failure and risk
analysis methods, and methods related to the research presented
here.
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURE
The systems engineering process describes how complex
systems are brought from initial concept to production, customer
delivery and use, maintenance and upgrade, and disposal [1, 2].
Groups such as the International Council on Systems Engineer-
ing (INCOSE) provide relevant detailed and specific knowledge
on the process [3]. Of particular interest to this research is the
early phase of systems engineering that is encompassed by the
system architecting process [2, 4, 5]. System architecting in-
cludes developing customer needs statements, design reference
missions, system requirements, functional system models, trade-
off studies, and a variety of other work products [2,5,6]. This in-
formation is generally stored in a database that can be interpreted
by a system architecture framework [7] such as the Department
of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) [8] which was
specifically modified in the V2.0 release to heavily encourage the
use of a database [9]. Many other frameworks are available that
are suitable for a variety of industries and products [7,10–13]. Of
particular interest to this research is the functional modeling and
trade-off studies conducted during the system architecture phase
of systems engineering.
Another aspect of systems engineering that is important to
this research is the concept of a SoS. SoS is an emerging area
of interest in systems engineering that focuses on understanding
how groups of systems interact and work together [14–17]. In re-
cent years, advances have been made in understanding how to de-
velop SoS that are mixed legacy and new development systems,
that are rapidly assembled for a particular SoS goal or mission,
and a host of other advances [16,18–22]. This research is specif-
ically interested in how the risk of SoS failure is understood and
SoS failure risk is mitigated [23].
While some systems engineering and architecture methods
do suggest that spurious system emissions be analyzed and mit-
igated, such efforts are only implicitly indicated in the system
architecture (conceptual design) phase through requirements de-
velopment and management. Many standards (DoD, ISO, FCC,
etc.) explicitly call for requirements on spurious system emis-
sions. However, efforts to determine potential spurious system
emissions generally fall much later in the system design process
and sometimes do not occur until physical prototype testing oc-
curs.
FUNCTIONAL MODELING
Functional modeling is a method of modeling how a system
works at the fundamental functional level [24] and is a subset of
system modeling [25–28]. There are a variety of different tax-
onomies available to produce functional models [29]. We prefer
the Functional Basis for Engineering Design (FBED) and use it
throughout this paper [30, 31]. However, other functional mod-
eling taxonomies [32, 33] may be more appropriate for specific
applications.
A functional modeling taxonomy generally is composed of
functions and flows. Functions act upon the flows to transform
incoming flows to different outgoing flows. For example, a func-
tion may accept electrical energy in and output thermal energy
[30]. Functions and flows are connected to their physical compo-
nent solutions through databases and repositories [34–39]. One
function may have many potential component solutions. For ex-
ample, a convert electrical energy to rotational energy function
may be satisfied by several types of electrical motors. Similarly,
one flow may have many different physical manifestations, such
as an energy-electrical flow being physically manifested as an
alternating current or a direct current [40].
A variety of techniques to analyze a risk, sustainability,
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failure, and other useful system design concerns have been de-
veloped around functional modeling. Topics important to the
method presented in this paper are discussed in a subsequent
subsection. However, no functional modeling-based technique
that we are aware of focuses on mitigating spurious system emis-
sions.
FAILURE ANALYSIS
Failure analysis has become an integral part of systems en-
gineering over the past 75 years. A major milestone in the ad-
vancement of understanding and preventing failure in system
design was the advent of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) [41] and the related Failure Modes Effects and Criti-
cality Analysis (FMECA) [42, 43]. Both are extensively used
throughout the DoD and DoD contractors [41] (where MIL-STD-
882E prescribes FMECA [44]), the automotive industry [45], and
other industries [46].
PRA was developed in part as an effort to understand com-
plex system failures and has roots in the nuclear power and
aerospace industries [47–51]. PRA helped to popularize the con-
cept of an initiating event – an event that is the starting point for a
failure that propagates through a system [52–54]. Many systems
engineered using PRA have the ability to catch incipient failures
and either transition to a safe shutdown state or continue oper-
ating either nominally or in a degraded state while repairs are
made [55–57]. PRA produces cut-sets which are sets of events
that must all occur in order for a system failure to occur. Each
cut-set represents a specific sequence of events that leads to a
system failure, and each cut-set is quantified with a probability
of occurrence computed from the probability of each event in the
chain of events [58, 59]. The probabilities of all cut-sets for a
specific system can be summed to find the overall probability of
a system failing [60]. This research uses the concept of initiating
events, probabilistic mathematics, and cut-sets, all of which were
largely developed by PRA.
Existing failure analysis methods do have capabilities to in-
vestigate and propose mitigation strategies for spurious system
emissions. However, such work is generally done long after
functional models of the systems have been completed and the
conceptual design phase has ended. This constrains systems en-
gineers and designers from making large architectural changes to
address spurious systems emissions without incurring significant
financial and schedule costs.
0.1 RESILIENCE, ROBUSTNESS, AND SURVIVABIL-
ITY ANALYSIS
Many methods exist to examine resilience [61–63], robust-
ness [64, 65], and survivability [66, 67] of systems both from the
standpoint of challenges introduced from the environment and
from the standpoint of other systems within a SoS. The topics of
resilience, robustness, and survivability have significant overlap.
We suggest that the high-level goal of each of the topics is the
same: the system must work in spite of non-nominal and poten-
tially unexpected conditions encountered.
Techniques to examine resilience, robustness, and surviv-
ability are found throughout much of the system design process.
However, none that we are aware of take a quantitative functional
approach.
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE ANALYSIS
Reliability block diagrams (RBDs) were developed in part to
better understand how system reliability is impacted by the way
functions are connected together in a system [68, 69]. Some im-
plementations of RBDs use functional representations of systems
while other RBD implementations use components and subsys-
tem representations [70–73]. In order to improve system relia-
bility, a common technique is to have multiple parallel redundant
critical functions [24]. RBDs are used extensively in industries
including defense [74], aerospace [75], and more [76, 77].
A family of methods has been developed over the past two
decades to analyze failure events from a functional perspective.
Initial work was done to combine FMEAs and functional mod-
els [78] which was followed by other early techniques to ana-
lyze risk of failure from a functional perspective [79–87]. Work
over the last decade has focused on a family of methods based
around the function failure identification and propagation (FFIP)
method [88] and the companion flow state logic (FSL) method
[89]. The FFIP family of methods has been expanded to ex-
amine how prognostics and health management systems can be
designed during system architecture [90], how failure flows may
jump between systems using the uncoupled failure flow state rea-
soner (UFFSR) [91], how to protect against uncoupled failure
flows within a system [92], how systems can deal with a variety
of unanticipated external initiating events in a SoS [23], and sev-
eral other important advances [93–100]. We use the FFIP family
of methods extensively throughout the research in this paper.
While one functional failure method in particular that is dis-
cussed in the following section does focus on spurious system
emissions, it only looks at how to protect against receiving such
emissions rather than not emitting in the first place. This is in
contrast with the method that we present below which specifi-
cally focuses on being a ”good neighbor” and not allowing spu-
rious system emissions occur.
DIRECTLY APPLICABLE RELATED WORK
Several related works are of relevance to this paper. For
instance, failures jumping between unrelated and unconnected
functions was first explored by O’Halloran et. al. through the
UFFSR method [91]. Later work expanded the idea further to in-
clude initiating events entering systems along non-nominal flow
paths [23]. We extend the idea in this paper to include failure
flows exiting systems along non-nominal flow paths.
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The irrational system behavior analysis method [23] exam-
ines how systems can respond to unexpected external initiating
events in a SoS. Such initiating events are caused by a system
within a SoS behaving in an unexpected manner. This research
is in part an effort to address such initiating events from the per-
spective of the system emitting the unexpected failure flows that
result in unexpected external initiating events for other systems.
The concept of mitigating failure flows through dedicated
failure flow arrestor functions [92] was proposed in response to
the UFFSR method [91] to protect critical functions within a sys-
tem from failure flows jumping between unrelated subsystems.
We expand upon the idea to develop mitigation strategies for fail-
ure flows that exit system boundaries as spurious emissions.
In summary: the research we present in this paper is based
upon a significant heritage of research and professional practice
in systems engineering and failure analysis. While the meth-
ods available to systems designers and engineers to understand
failures, model systems, and mitigate potential spurious system
emissions is large, no existing method combines all of these
things during the conceptual system design phase where large
architectural changes can be made with minimal time or cost
penalty to a system design project. The method we present below
fills a gap and a need in the existing literature and methodologies.
METHODOLOGY
In this section we present a method to identify potential
spurious system emissions, quantify potential emission proba-
bilities, identify potential mitigation strategies to prevent spuri-
ous emissions from causing harm to other systems, and conduct
trade-off studies to determine the best course of action moving
forward with the system design. The method is useful for un-
derstanding and improving the suitability of a system for inclu-
sion in a SoS where it is important to be a good neighbor with
the other systems. The system architecture phase is the intended
place within the systems engineering process to use the method.
The below method is most appropriate for systems that
have well-understood components where sufficient failure data
is available. For instance, a new airplane design using compo-
nents that are either commercial off the shelf (COTS) or are suf-
ficiently similar to COTS to use COTS failure data is an accept-
able system to be analyzed by the method. A system containing
many novel components that have no failure data available and
no COTS equivalents is not appropriate.
The method is intended to be semi-automated. While it is
possible to conduct the method by hand, an unacceptable amount
of time would be necessary to iterate through the method. In-
stead, the initial pass through the method is partially manually
conducted to build the requisite models and databases. Subse-
quent iterations of the method are handled automatically but with
human-in-the-loop analysis of results at the end of each iteration
to ensure that the results make sense.
CASE STUDY
We introduce an illustrative case study of an autonomous ve-
hicle that is being designed to enter service with an autonomous
logistics system (the SoS). The SoS operates in a desert environ-
ment carrying materiel to a forward operating base. This frees
up military personnel and contractors from routine and poten-
tially dangerous resupply missions [101] to concentrate on other
high value activities. There are other constituent members of the
SoS including ground control stations, command and control re-
lay stations, and other autonomous systems such as autonomous
ground vehicles. The SoS is expected to have additional hetero-
geneous members added in the future as logistics demands dic-
tate expansion to a nearby littoral zone where autonomous sur-
face and underwater vessels may be used.
The system architecture process has already down-selected
to the production of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for the
specific payloads and mission constraints identified during the
development of the customer needs statement, the design refer-
ence mission, and the system requirements (shown in Table 1).
The UAV was down-selected from other potential options (e.g.:
surface vehicles, ballistic trajectory delivery, etc.) because of the
need for rapid payload delivery of cargo that is sensitive to shock
and vibration.
Req # Requirement
#1 Carry 10kg 5km
#2 Complete round-trip transit with 99% suc-
cess rate




TABLE 1. Generic set of requirements for a UAV used to carry cargo.
While the system presented in this paper is generic, it takes
inspiration from real systems. The importance of the case study
is not to show a real system designed to mitigate spurious system
emissions in a real SoS. The case study is used to illustrate the
method presented below and has been intentionally simplified to
better highlight the specific contributions of the method.
PREPARATORY STEP
Prior to using the method, several preparations must be
made. They fall into two categories: 1) to prepare an FFIP model
of the system that will be used throughout the method, and 2) to
prepare information for the trade-off study conducted in Steps 6
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and 7.
First, a functional model of the system of interest must be
developed. In order to do this, a functional taxonomy must be
chosen for use throughout the project. We recommend using
the FBED taxonomy [30] although there are many other choices
available to the practitioner. If following the common system ar-
chitecture process, a practitioner likely already will have a func-
tional model as part of modeling the system [5]. Figure 1 shows
a high-level functional model for a UAV developed using FBED.
Following the development of a functional model of the sys-
tem, a function to component relational database must be de-
veloped [37, 39]. This entails identifying potential component
solutions to functions. Historical data about similar systems is
useful to build out such databases. For instance, design reposito-
ries may hold such information [34]. Table 2 demonstrates what
a function to component relational database contains.
Function Component Solution
Channel-Guide-Rotate DC Electrical Motor
AC Electrical Motor
Pneumatic Motor





TABLE 2. Generic function to component repository for a UAV.
Note that we have omitted cost and performance data from
Table 2 and from the rest of the methodology for nominal func-
tions. However in practice, this information is generally included
in such databases and used to conduct trade-off studies when se-
lecting specific components to solve functions [102, 103]. We
have omitted this information here to focus on the contributions
of this method.
The function to component relational database must then be
expanded to include failure data and failure modes [89,104]. This
includes historical component failure information that is then
wrapped up to the functional level [102, 105]. This also includes
information on how failure flows can be received into a func-
tion, how the function might be impacted by the failure flows,
and what failure flows the function might emit [89,95,104]. This
information is then placed into an algorithm for future use. Algo-
rithm 1 demonstrates what this looks like for a generic function
using a modified version of FSL [89] where more details on de-
veloping FSL pseudocode.
input : Nominal Flows, Failure Flows, System
Operation Status
output: Nominal Flows, Failure Flows
Let P1 = Sample from a Uniform(0,1) Random
Distribution
Let P2 = Sample from a Uniform(0,1) Random
Distribution
while System Operation Status == True do
if Energy-Electrical Failure Import Flow == True
then
if 0.2 < P1 < 0.4 then
Export Failure Flow = Energy-Thermal,
Material-Mixture-Gas/Solid Export
Nominal Flow = False
end
else if P1≤ 0.2) then
Export Failure Flow = Energy-Electrical
Export Nominal Flow = False
end
else
if Electrical-Energy Nominal Import == True
then
Export Failure Flow = False Export
Nominal Flow = Energy-Electrical
if Material-Solid-Object Failure Import Flow ==
True then
if P2 < 0.2 then
Export Failure Flow = Energy-Thermal,
Material-Mixture-Gas/Solid Export
Nominal Flow = False
end
else
Export Failure Flow = False
if Electrical Energy Nominal Import == True
then
Export Nominal Flow =
Energy-Electrical
else
Export Nominal Flow = False
end
if Failure Import Flow == False then
if Electrical-Energy Nominal Import == True
then
Export Nominal Flow = Energy-Electrical
else
Export Nominal Flow = False
end
else
Export Nominal Flow = False
end
end
Algorithm 1: Failure flow information for a generic Provision-
Supply function.
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FIGURE 1. Generic functional model of a UAV developed using the FBED taxonomy. Note the dotted and dashed line represents the system
boundary. The dashed line represents a failure flow system emission.
Next, system requirements information must be collected.
Of specific interest is performance metrics and system con-
straints. Cost and failure probability constraints in particular are
required to use this method. Other requirements and constraints
will vary depending upon the individual system. Both the sys-
tems engineering process and the mechanical design process ad-
vocate for developing system or product requirements [5, 106]
at the start of their respective development cycles. Thus, this
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method assumes that adequate requirements have already been
developed for the system. Table 1 shows a generic set of require-
ments for a UAV. This information will help to set goals for the
trade-off studies conducted in Step 6 of the method.
Finally, an analysis of the system of interest’s place in a
larger SOS environment must be undertaken. Questions to ask
are: (1) what other systems are present, (2) how important is it
that each system continues to function, (3) what is the cost of
having a system fail, and (4) what external event(s) may cause
a system to fail [23]. The resulting information then must be
placed in terms of consequences for other systems within the
SOS failing. An example of consequence data is shown in Table
3 for a generic heterogeneous mixed UAV and unmanned ground
vehicle (UGV) swarm. The consequence is determined by the
cost distribution function, Ce, defined as the probability density
of the cost of a system damaging other systems within a SoS
from emitted failure flows.
STEP 1: ANALYSIS OF EACH FUNCTION AND WHAT IT
CONCEIVABLY COULD EMIT
In the preparatory step, a function to component relational
database was developed. In addition to function to component
mapping and related information [37, 39], the previously devel-
oped database contains failure modes information [80] as shown
in Algorithm 1. Now the failure modes must be expanded to
go beyond failures that have been previously observed. Previous
work has dealt with expanding knowledge of what failure flows
may impact a function [23] where analysis of the entire flow set
is conducted for each function. This analysis must be done for
each function in order to build out a complete algorithm beyond
what was done in the Preparatory Step.
We propose a goal of examining all possible failure flows
that may be emitted by a function – similar in principle to the
broad identification of failures via FMEA. This requires careful
examination of what may be emitted by a function in all of its
failure states. After understanding what failure flows might be
received by a function, then a better understanding of what fail-
ure flows may be emitted by a function can be developed. We
caution the practitioner that even the most outlandish scenarios
for generating a specific failure flow emission from a function
must be considered. While the fields of risk analysis and relia-
bility engineering have gotten very good at identifying potential
failures based on what has been observed in similar systems in
the past, highly improbable failures that were discounted or not
considered during the conceptual phase of systems engineering
continue to happen [107, 108].
To identify a high proportion of all possible emitted failure
flows, we propose working backwards from the flow taxonomy
of FBED to attempt to disprove the hypothesis that each of the
flow types can be emitted as a failure flow by the function in
question. For instance, the Energy-Thermal flow may be gener-
ated by a function such as Control-Stop-Inhibit where the com-
ponent solution is a metal barrier if the function receives a failure
flow input such as Energy-Vibration where the flow’s physical
solution is a high frequency, high amplitude vibration caused by
an unanticipated failure somewhere else in the system. Table 4
presents an example of a generic function where received fail-
ure flows are connected to emitted failure flows. The crossed-out
failure flow exports represent those exports that have been found
to be impossible to create regardless of the failure flow import
to the function. The component solutions for the function ex-
amined in Table 4 indicate which component solutions, as seen
in Table 2, may create which failure flows. Significant additional
documentation is developed for each potential failure flow export
to strongly disprove that it is possible. We recommend that this
document take a form similar to workbooks developed for basic
events and initiating events in PRA models in the nuclear power
industry [109]. However, we acknowledge that this may be im-
practical for early conceptual system design trade-off studies in
which case, we advise that the practitioner identifies an accept-
able level of rigor and documentation to follow when analyzing
each potential failure flow export. In either case, it is important to
maintain the link between the functional model and the physical
solutions of functions and flows. An added layer of complexity
in this step of the method is that different physical solutions to a
function may have different responses to failure flow imports.
The above newly identified failure flow exports from the
function are then appended to the function’s failure logic algo-
rithm. We have omitted a demonstration of this part of the step
due to space constraints.
STEP 2: EVALUATE ALL POTENTIAL FLOW PATHS
THROUGH THE SYSTEM
Following the analysis of what each function may conceiv-
ably emit, the next step is to evaluate all potential failure flow
paths through the system of interest. We recommend using es-
tablished FFIP/FSL [89, 104] and UFFSR [91] methodology for
determining what flows may traverse a system. Note however
that at this point in time, we are not assigning probabilities to in-
dividual flow paths, functional failure events, or initiating events.
The method intentionally does not assign probabilities at this step
to avoid the pitfalls of truncation of failure flow paths that often
occurs during FFIP-style analyses. While the PRA literature and
other probabilistic approaches to failure analysis advises prac-
titioners to set practical truncation limits, we suggest that the
O’Halloran et. al. approach [97] be followed instead to find
all potential failure flow paths. This helps to prevent missing
potential low probability, high consequence failure flows. Fur-
ther, certain very low probability failure flow paths that produce
failure flow emissions contribute to a higher probability of the
failure flow emission occurring.
The drawback to examining all possible failure flow paths
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Failure Flow Exports from System of Interest that
Lead to Initiating Events for Other Systems in SoS
Consequence Ce
Energy-Electrical Static-electric discharges during dust storms caused by UAV rotors or
propellers can short out onboard electronics of nearby vehicles leading
to loss of both UAVs and UGVs
$5M
Material-Solid-Particulate Large particulate from crashed UAVs can clog air vents and cause over-
heating of UGVs leading to disabled systems
$1M
Material-Control-Analog Interference with radio transceivers causes UAVs to automatically land





TABLE 3. Consequence data for an mixed UAV and UGV SoS where consequence the cost distribution function Ce for the impact of the system on
the SoS. In this example, each Ce is a point distribution.
through a system is that it becomes computationally expensive.
O’Halloran et. al. [97] provides insights on how to overcome
this issue. For instance, it may become necessary to truncate
specific failure flow paths due to computational costs in which
case, truncating based on the failure flow path length (i.e.: how
many functions the failure flow traverses) may be appropriate.
Some example failure flow paths that exit the system bound-
ary from the generic UAV system used throughout the method
are presented in Table 5. Note that we are not assigning proba-
bilities at this step in the method.
STEP 3: DETERMINE PROBABILITIES OF SPURIOUS
EXITING FLOWS
After all failure flow paths have been identified, the next
step is to quantify the probability of each failure flow emission
from the system. This step diverges from established practices
in the FFIP family of methods. Rather than stopping at produc-
ing cut-set results that are analyzed individually, the probability
of each spurious failure flow emission is developed from aggre-
gating cut-sets into groups based on the specific spurious failure
flow emissions that they produce. In this context, cut-sets are
defined as the path that each failure flow travels from the initial
failure event to exiting the system as a spurious failure flow emis-
sion. The definition is in line with how cut-sets have been used
in recent FFIP-related research [23, 95, 98, 99] and is similar to
how cut-sets are defined in the PRA literature [60].
A table of system-level failure flows is generated from this
step. Table 6 shows a representative set of data for a generic
UAV system. Note that only the failure flow emissions identi-
fied through analysis of this method are present. Each failure
flow emission type and probability of occurrence, POe, is listed
where the probability is an aggregation of all failure flow path
cut-sets that result in that particular failure flow emission type.
POe can either be a point value or a probability density func-
tion although we recommend using probability density functions
wherever possible. We recommend that all failure flow emis-
sions that travel along both nominal flow export paths and along
uncoupled flow export paths are represented in this table. Fail-
ure flow system emissions for the purposes of this method are
defined as flow paths that leave the system boundary.
Note that the probabilities shown in Table 6 are aggregated
from the component solution probabilities shown in Table 4. In
other words, Table 6 shows the combined probabilities of each
function’s component solutions. As decisions are made on how
to satisfy individual functions with component solutions during
the systems engineering process, the probability statistics will
change. Because of this, we recommend rerunning the method-
ology as major design decisions are made and components are
selected.
STEP 4: ANALYZE RESULTS
Now that failure flow system emissions are identified and the
probabilities of occurrence are calculated, analysis of the results
can be conducted. There are two potential approaches that practi-
tioners may use at this step including: (1) identifying the highest
probability of occurrence failure flow system emissions and rank
ordering them according to their probabilities, and (2) examin-
ing the other systems within the SoS that may be impacted by
the failure flow system emissions. The first approach is the stan-
dard approach often taken in FMEA and other analyses [6]. We
advocate that the second approach be taken and provide further
details below.
Table 3 from the preparatory step of the method provides
a means for evaluating how failure flow system emissions from
the system of interest may impact other systems in the SoS. A
mapping of failure flow system emissions to initiating events of
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TABLE 4. Generic example of examining potential failure flows and determining if they can occur using the FBED flow set for a Channel-Guide-
Rotate function in a UAV system. Failure flows generated by specific component solutions are indicated on the right hand side of the table.
Failure Flow Imports → Failure Flow Exports
Primary Secondary Tertiary → Primary Secondary Tertiary Component Solution(s) to Function
Material XXXHuman
Energy Mechanical Translational → Gas DC Motor
Energy Electrical → Liquid AC Motor
Energy Mechanical Translational → Solid Object DC Motor, AC Motor






















Energy Mechanical Pneumatic → Visual Pneumatic Motor
Energy Electrical → Control Analog AC Motor





















Energy Radioactive/Nuclear → Thermal AC Motor, DC Motor, Pneumatic Motor
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Flow Path # Failure Flow Path
#1 Energy-Electrical → Provision-Supply →
Energy-Electrical → Channel-Export → Signal-
Control-Discrete
#2 Material-Mixture-Gas/Solid → Channel-Guide-
Translate→Material-Solid




TABLE 5. Example failure flow paths of a generic UAV system that
exit the system boundary.
Failure Flow System Emission POe
Energy, Mechanical, Translational 2.2E-4/year
Material, Gas 4.3E-3/year
Signal, Status, Visual 5.6E-3/year




TABLE 6. Probability of occurrence of a representative set of failure
flow system emissions for a generic UAV system.
other systems with a probability of negative consequence (Pe) to
the other systems can be produced. The probability of the neg-
ative consequence can take the form of a point value or a distri-
bution and is dictated by the information that is available to the
practitioner. Early in a system design process, only point value
estimates may be available but as the system architecture effort
moves forward, more detailed probabilistic information may be
available. Note that Pe does not indicate how severe the conse-
quences are to the other systems in the SoS. The result of this
effort can provide a reasonable indication of priorities for what
failure flow system emissions are most important. Table 7 pro-
vides an example of what such efforts may produce.
While the analysis approach shown in Table 7 is sufficient
for early analysis of the system to determine priorities for ad-
dressing failure flow system emissions, a more nuanced under-
standing of the order of importance is desirable. Table 7 deter-
mines priority of addressing failure flow system emissions but
does not provide an indication of how important one failure flow
system emission is as compared to another. For instance, a high
probability and thus a high priority flow from Table 7 may have







TABLE 7. Priority ranking based on probability of adversely impact-
ing other systems in the SOS with a failure flow leaving the system
boundary as a spurious emission (Pe). Note that Pe is not the same as the
probability of occurrence in Table 6 – Pe is the probability of negative
consequences on other systems in the SoS while probability of occur-
rence is of the failure flow being emitted from the system.
a very minimal impact on other systems in the SoS while a lower
probability and priority flow may have a much more significant
impact on other SoS systems. In extreme cases, a very low
probability and low priority failure flow system emission may
in fact cause catastrophic loss of the entire SoS. An example of
this is a drone in a SoS of many drones emitting a large electro-
magnetic frequency (EMF) burst after coming into contact with
power lines which may interrupt command and control of other
nearby drones, resulting in them immediately attempting to land
regardless of terrain features below them. This in turn may result
in the damage, destruction, or loss of many drones.
We propose Emission Priority Distribution (EPD) as a met-
ric to make comparisons between failure flow system emissions
similar to how the Risk Priority Number (RPN) that FMEA pro-
duces is used. The calculation to produce EPD for a given flow
emission e is provided in Equation 1.
EPDe = Pe ∗Ce (1)
In the EPD equation, the probability Pe, from Table 6, cap-
tures all SoS consequence probabilities (either as point probabil-
ities or probability distributions). The cost distribution function
Ce, from Table 3, captures all SoS consequence costs (either as
point values or cost distribution functions) for a given failure flow
emission leaving the system boundary. This is broadly similar to
how FMEA produces a RPN to indicate where the largest risks
of system failure exist. In the case of EPD, the Ce is similar to the
severity of occurrence while the Pe is similar to the combination
of the probability of occurrence and detectability of failure.
A generic analysis containing such information is shown in
Table 8 where an EPD is produced to help rank order the relative
importance of various failure flow system emissions.
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Failure Flow System Emission Pe Ce EPD
Energy-Mechanical-Translational 5.2E-4/year $5M $2600/yr
Material-Solid-Particulate 1.9E-5/year $1M $19/year





TABLE 8. EPD Analysis of a generic UAV system that is part of a mixed UAV and UGV SoS. Pe comes from Table 6 and Ce is from Table 3.
STEP 5: IDENTIFY SPURIOUS FLOW EMISSION MITI-
GATION STRATEGIES
The next step is to develop methods to mitigate failure flow
system emissions before they leave the system of interest. In this
method, we advocate for addressing such spurious emissions be-
fore they leave the system boundary. Other approaches such as
hardening other systems within a SoS against unexpected failure
flows has been addressed in [23] and elsewhere [92]. We specif-
ically advocate for mitigating failure flow system emissions at
the source system in order to for the system to be a ”good neigh-
bor” within the SoS. This is in line with guidance in a number of
industries and communities of practice such as Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) rules on spurious EMF from prod-
ucts [110] and California Air Resource Board (CARB) rules on
automotive tailpipe emissions [111]. However, we acknowledge
that selfish design leading to “the tragedy of the commons” is a
common and unfortunate approach to dealing with undesirable
system emissions [112, 113].
Mitigation strategies are likely to be diverse and creative.
However, a database of mitigation techniques can be built for a
given system where there may be many strategies to mitigate one
failure flow system emission or one mitigation strategy that will
prevent or reduce the probability of one or more emissions leav-
ing the system boundary. We recommend information on mitiga-
tion strategies include both the functional representation and the
physical solution to each mitigation strategy. Additionally, infor-
mation on (1) the likelihood of completely mitigating the failure
flow system emission, (2) other failure flows that may be cre-
ated by the mitigation strategy, and (3) other relevant failure data
should be captured at this stage. Table 9 shows a generic exam-
ple of several mitigation strategies. This is in line with previous
work on failure flow arrestor functions [92]. As with Step 1, we
advocate that sufficient and significant analysis be undertaken for
each proposed mitigation strategy. However, we acknowledge
that this may be impractical for practitioners, especially those
working at the early phase of design.
In Table 9, PMe is the probability distribution function of a
mitigated system failure flow emission still occurring in spite of
the mitigation strategy. NFFLS (New Failure Flow Leaving Sys-
tem) represents if a new failure flow may leave the system as a
spurious emission. PM f is the probability distribution function
of a new failure flow identified by NFFLS leaving the system.
Note that PM f does not provide insight into if the new failure
flow system emission can damage other systems within the SoS.
MC is the mitigation implementation cost distribution function.
In all cases where there are either probability or cost distribu-
tion functions, we acknowledge that insufficient data early in the
system architecture and system engineering process will force
practitioners to use point values rather than distributions at least
initially. In subsequent iterations of the method as the system
design progresses, distributions can be included to gain a more
nuanced understanding of the emissions.
In order to understand what mitigation strategies are pre-
ferred, we proposed developing a mitigation probability distri-
bution (MPD) which is similar in formulation to EPD. To calcu-
late a population of MPDs where one mitigation strategy may be
useful in mitigating several failure flow system emissions (or one
emission may be addressed to different extents by different mit-
igation strategies), a matrix is populated with EPDs that reflect
a reduction in Pe, denoted by EPDReduced. Equation 2 demon-
strates how to calculate EPDReduced where e is the failure flow
system emission and m is the mitigation strategy.
EPDReduced(e,m) = PMe(e,m) ∗Ce(e,m) (2)
An example of the matrix that is populated by Equation 2
is shown in Matrix 1. Here, each row corresponds to a failure
emission while each column corresponds to a mitigation strategy.
Many of the cells resolve to zero in this matrix, indicating that
the mitigation strategy has no impact on that emission.
Next, MPD can be calculated for the matrix produced from
Equation 2 as shown in Equation 3. In this equation,
−−→
EPD repre-
sents a column vector of the original EPDs as identified in Table
3.
MPD =−−→EPDᵀ ∗EPDReduced +MC (3)
























STEP 6: DETERMINE WHAT MITIGATION STRATEGIES
TO IMPLEMENT
In order to determine what mitigation strategies to imple-
ment in a system to make it a ”good neighbor” in a SoS, we pro-
pose the mitigation rank priority (MRP) metric which converts
the probability cost distribution function MDP into a metric than
can be more easily rank-ordered. Equation 4 shows how to de-





MRP as presented in Equation 4 is only one potential for-
mulation of MRP, where each term corresponds to the estimated
worst case (max), average case (mean), and predictability (stan-
dard deviation) of the distribution. Practitioners may wish to
change the formulation depending on, for instance, how much
confidence they have in their data sources. The important aspect
of MRP for the purposes of this method is that it can be used
to develop rank orderings and trade space exploration graphics
which may be useful to system stakeholders and decision-makers
for their understanding of failure flow system emission risks and
mitigation strategies. In short: MRP helps in the communication
of risk management to stakeholders and decision-makers.
At this point in the method, trade-off studies and optimiza-
tion can be conducted between major system constraints and re-
quirements, mitigation strategies and their corresponding reduc-
tion in probability of a failure flow system emission from leav-
ing the system boundary and adversely impacting other systems
within the SoS, and other important system performance met-
rics. One approach of interest to practitioners is to maximize to-
tal MRP (sum of all MRPm identified for implementation) within
the constraint of a cost cap on total mitigation cost (MC).
In general, the goal of a trade-off study or an optimization
is to identify the combination of mitigation strategies from both
a functional and a component solution perspective that provides
the greatest overall reduction in potential cost to the SoS. While
it may be possible to develop a system that does not have the
potential to produce any failure flow system emissions that are
deleterious to the SoS, the cost of such an undertaking is likely
too high to be practical. Instead, a balance must be struck be-
tween the cost of mitigation strategies selected, the reduction in
cost of the consequences to the SoS, and the available budget to
implement the mitigation strategies. It is also important to keep
in mind the original failure probability targets set in the Prepara-
tory Step of this method.
STEP 7: ITERATE AND REANALYZE
At this point, mitigation strategies have been chosen and are
ready for implementation into the system functional model. We
recommend iterating through the method again to verify that the
mitigation strategies have not introduced new failures into the
system or failure flow system emissions that are undesirable. In
particular, Table 9 indicates if there are new failure flows (not
quantified in the above method to this point) and failure flow sys-
tem emissions (PM f ) created by the proposed mitigation strate-
gies. In the preceding steps, these were not addressed in the MRP
and earlier calculations.
Re-analysis is further justified by the potential for the failure
probability requirements set in the Preparatory Phase being vio-
lated from unintended consequences of the mitigation strategies.
For instance, a new rotor shroud on a UAV may significantly re-
duce payload capacity thus violating Requirement #1 from Table
1. The information developed in the first pass through the method
can be largely re-used to speed the analysis of the system design
by using a software implementation of the method to rapidly de-
velop new iterations of the system design. However, at the end
of each iteration, we recommend that a human remain in the loop
to verify that results are realistic.
Iteration of the system design through the methodology
stops when the specific goals, targets, and requirements set in the
Preparatory Step of the methodology are met. At this point, the
practitioner can be relatively confident in an exhaustive consid-
eration of potential spurious system emissions having been con-
ducted. Further, a practitioner can be assured that a significant
assessment of potential mitigation strategies has been completed.
The resulting system design is expected to produce fewer spuri-
ous system emissions that may damage other systems within the
SoS.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CASE STUDY RESULT INSIGHTS
The case study demonstrates the types of unexpected in-
sights that this method can uncover and address. The first is that
a variety of failure flow emissions may make UAVs in a SoS
more detectable by adversaries. The second is that failures in
subsystems such as those involved electronic warfare counter-
measures may cause failure flow system emissions that have a
significant detrimental effect to the other systems in the SoS in-
cluding a disruption in communications and a higher potential
for ”friendly fire” incidents. The method provides a framework
to not only identify these emissions and communicate their im-
pacts, but to weigh the tradeoffs between mitigation strategies
at the functional stage. This includes the capability compare a
portfolio of many cheap mitigation strategies against a portfolio
of few expensive mitigation strategies, weigh their relative cost
versus effectiveness, and come to a decision.
DISCUSSION
The method presented above has several benefits and draw-
backs discussed in this section. Additionally, guidance and dis-
cussion on how to implement the method in software is provided.
One significant challenge of the method is the amount of ef-
fort required to develop the various database products and anal-
yses. However, we argue that similar efforts are needed for PRA
and for other FFIP-based methods. In our experience, PRA anal-
ysis can be extremely data-intensive [109].
If this method is more widely adopted, the databases needed
to run the analysis can be reused where the data is appropriate
to new system and SoS development. A failure and mitigation
repository similar to functional design repositories [38] and com-
ponent failure databases [114] can be developed. Such an effort
would also support a computer conducting a greater portion of
the analysis and may eventually lead to a fully automated imple-
mentation.
One limitation of the method is that it is specifically de-
signed to be used in the case where a practitioner has a good
understanding of the SoS that the system being engineered will
be placed within. In the case where an entirely new SoS is under
development, additional methodological development is needed
to manage the uncertainty posed by the situation. If nothing is
known of the SoS, Ce cannot be determined. The only informa-
tion available to a practitioner would then be POe.
In order to implement the methodology presented above in
software, we suggest using code and methods developed by Short
et. al. [96], by Jensen et. al. [89], by O’Halloran et. al. [91],
and by O’Halloran et. al. [97] to conduct the FFIP-style failure
flow cut-set analysis in Step 2 and the probability quantification
in Step 3. The databases developed in the Preparatory Step and
in Step 1 can be integrated into the above mentioned code. The
equations and tables in subsequent steps can be implemented into
the proposed software.
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While developing the probability density functions and cost
density functions for the method, practitioners may be in a sit-
uation where they are very uncertain about the validity of avail-
able data. In this case, we have successfully used the Jeffreys
Prior [115] in our professional practices and can recommend its
use. In essence, the Jeffreys Prior when used in the context of
the various probability and cost density functions in this method
indicates that there is great uncertainty about the actual distribu-
tion.
Validation of the results of the method is an important step
that we advocate be performed by a human. We have designed
the method to include a human in the loop at every iteration in
order to validate that the results are reasonable. While automat-
ing the validation may be possible in the future and with a very
robust failure and mitigation repository, such an undertaking is
very resource-intensive. The method is intended to be used in
the system architecture phase of the systems engineering process
where rapid trade-off studies and iterations of the proposed de-
sign are valued. There are other potential methods of validating
the individual elements of the method although such validations
have already been published [88, 89, 97, 102, 103]. Validation of
the usefulness of alternative functional models is a design pro-
cess is also in the literature [116]. Thus, we recommend that a
human remain in the loop when using the method for the fore-
seeable future.
The method presented above differs from existing meth-
ods of identifying and mitigating spurious system emissions in
a SoS context in several ways. Most existing methods such as
requirements management, PRA and FMEA, and other similar
techniques from the systems engineering community either only
implicitly suggest that spurious system emissions be examined
and mitigated at the conceptual stage of design before functional
architecture has been solidified or explicitly examine spurious
systems emissions after functional architectures have been final-
ized and component design has begun. While an existing func-
tional failure analysis method does look at spurious system emis-
sions, it does so from the perspective of defending against the
spurious systems emissions rather than preventing the emissions
from occurring. The method introduced in this text specifically
takes a quantitative functional approach to analyze spurious sys-
tem emissions and prevent them from exiting the system bound-
ary to interfere with other members of the SoS. This is differ-
ent than performing a sensitivity analysis on a functional model
or on any existing functional failure analysis method because
the method presented above provides insights into what spuri-
ous system emissions may occur, how bad the spurious system
emissions might be, what to do about the spurious system emis-
sions, and the ranked importance of mitigating spurious system
emissions.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented a conceptual design method intended
for use during the system architecture phase of the systems en-
gineering process to identify and mitigate potential spurious sys-
tem emissions. The method is conducted using functional mod-
els which are appropriate for early system architecture trade-off
studies. A systematic way to identify potential low probability
but high consequence spurious system emissions is presented
using the FBED flow taxonomy. Practitioners are aided by the
method in identifying and mitigating spurious system emissions
to prevent damage to other systems within a SoS.
FUTURE WORK
Several potential fruitful avenues of future work have been
identified. A methodology to tie together failure analysis of an
SoS that bridges the method presented in this paper and else-
where [23] may provide a new way of making large system ar-
chitecture decisions while such decisions are still relatively inex-
pensive to implement. A potential barrier to such an implemen-
tation is the computational efficiency of analyzing many systems
using a FFIP-style approach.
Another potential area of future work is to capture prefer-
ences of engineers a priori and feed that information into an AI
to automatically choose optimal mitigation strategies. Similar
work has been conducted by McIntire in a mechanical design
context [117]. This is also similar to work done on engineering
risk attitudes [118, 119].
A potential area of research to expand on work [92] with fail-
ure arresting functions that is useful in the context of the method-
ology presented in this paper is to examine more complex miti-
gation strategies and build a mitigation strategy repository. For
instance, there may be mitigation strategies that contain spurious
emissions in very specific ways so that other systems in the SoS
on the receiving end of the spurious emission can robustly handle
the failure flow. Another example of a potential mitigation strat-
egy is a mitigation subsystem that can detect an incipient spuri-
ous emission and inject recovery flows into failed functions that
are about to emit the spurious emissions to prevent the emission
in the first place.
An expansion of the analysis presented in this paper could
include the idea of flow levels as developed by L’Her et. al. [90].
This may provide a more nuanced view of how far spurious emis-
sions can travel and the amount of damage that they can do within
a SoS. Including flow levels may be an intermediate step between
the method presented in this paper and a full physics-based sim-
ulation of the system and the SoS.
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[75] Düpow, H., and Blount, G., 1997. “A review of reliability
prediction”. Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technol-
ogy, 69(4), pp. 356–362.
[76] Wang, W., Loman, J. M., Arno, R. G., Vassiliou, P., Fur-
long, E. R., and Ogden, D., 2004. “Reliability block di-
agram simulation techniques applied to the ieee std. 493
standard network”. IEEE Transactions on Industry Appli-
cations, 40(3), pp. 887–895.
[77] Rausand, M., 2014. Reliability of Safety-Critical Systems:
Theory and Applications. Wiley.
[78] Hawkins, P. G., and Woollons, D. J., 1998. “Failure modes
and effects analysis of complex engineering systems using
functional models”. Artificial intelligence in engineering,
12(4), pp. 375–397.
[79] Tumer, I. Y., and Stone, R. B., 2003. “Mapping function to
failure mode during component development”. Research
in Engineering Design, 14(1), pp. 25–33.
[80] Stone, R. B., Tumer, I. Y., and Van Wie, M., 2005. “The
function-failure design method”. Journal of Mechanical
Design, 127(3), pp. 397–407.
[81] Kurtoglu, T., Campbell, M. I., Bryant, C. R., Stone, R. B.,
McAdams, D. A., et al., 2005. “Deriving a component
basis for computational functional synthesis”. In ICED
05: 15th International Conference on Engineering Design:
Engineering Design and the Global Economy, Engineers
Australia, p. 1687.
[82] Roberts, R. A., Stone, R. B., and Tumer, I. Y., 2002. “De-
riving function-failure similarity information for failure-
free rotorcraft component design”. In ASME 2002 Inter-
national Design Engineering Technical Conferences and
Computers and Information in Engineering Conference,
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, pp. 121–131.
[83] Tumer, I. Y., and Stone, R. B., 2001. “Analytical method
for mapping function to failure during high-risk compo-
nent development”. In Proceedings of the Design Engi-
neering Technical Conferences.
[84] Arunajadai, S. G., Stone, R. B., and Tumer, I. Y., 2002.
“A framework for creating a function-based design tool
for failure mode identification”.
[85] Stock, M. E., Stone, R. B., and Tumer, I. Y., 2003. “Going
back in time to improve design: the elemental function-
failure design method”. In ASME 2003 International De-
sign Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers
and Information in Engineering Conference, American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, pp. 431–441.
[86] Lough, K. G., Stone, R., and Tumer, I. Y., 2005. “Function
based risk assessment: mapping function to likelihood”.
In ASME 2005 International Design Engineering Techni-
cal Conferences and Computers and Information in En-
gineering Conference, American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, pp. 455–467.
[87] Hutcheson, R. S., McAdams, D. A., Stone, R. B., and













aval Postgraduate School user on 20 July 2020
Tumer, I. Y., 2007. “Function-based behavioral model-
ing”. In ASME 2007 International Design Engineering
Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in
Engineering Conference, American Society of Mechani-
cal Engineers, pp. 547–558.
[88] Kurtoglu, T., Tumer, I. Y., and Jensen, D. C., 2010. “A
functional failure reasoning methodology for evaluation
of conceptual system architectures”. Research in Engi-
neering Design, 21(4), pp. 209–234.
[89] Jensen, D., Tumer, I. Y., and Kurtoglu, T., 2009. “Flow
state logic (fsl) for analysis of failure propagation in early
design”. In International Design Theory and Methodology
Conference, IDETC/CIE, ASME, San Diego, CA.
[90] L’Her, G., Van Bossuyt, D. L., and O’Halloran, B. M.,
2017. “Prognostic systems representation in a function-
based bayesian model during engineering design”. Inter-
national Journal of Prognostics and Health Management,
8(2), p. 23.
[91] O’Halloran, B. M., Papakonstantinou, N., and
Van Bossuyt, D. L., 2015. “Modeling of function
failure propagation across uncoupled systems”. In Re-
liability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS), 2015
Annual, IEEE, pp. 1–6.
[92] Slater, M. R., and Van Bossuyt, D. L., 2015. “Toward a
dedicated failure flow arrestor function methodology”. In
ASME 2015 International Design Engineering Technical
Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineer-
ing Conference, American Society of Mechanical Engi-
neers, pp. V02AT03A050–V02AT03A050.
[93] Short, A. R., Van Bossuyt, D. L., et al., 2015. “Rerouting
failure flows using logic blocks in functional models for
improved system robustness: failure flow decision func-
tions”. ICED, Milan, Italy, July, pp. 27–30.
[94] O’Halloran, B. M., Papakonstantinou, N., and
Van Bossuyt, D. L., 2016. “Cable routing model-
ing in early system design to prevent cable failure
propagation events”. In 2016 Annual Reliability and
Maintainability Symposium (RAMS), IEEE, pp. 1–6.
[95] Short, A.-R., Lai, A. D., and Van Bossuyt, D. L., 2018.
“Conceptual design of sacrificial sub-systems: failure
flow decision functions”. Research in Engineering De-
sign, 29(1), pp. 23–38.
[96] Short, A.-R., Hodge, R. D., Van Bossuyt, D. L., and
DuPont, B., 2018. “Active mission success estimation
through functional modeling”. Research in Engineering
Design, 29(4), pp. 565–588.
[97] O’Halloran, B. M., Papakonstantinou, N., Giammarco, K.,
and Van Bossuyt, D. L., 2017. “A graph theory approach
to functional failure propagation in early complex cyber-
physical systems (ccpss)”. In INCOSE International Sym-
posium, Vol. 27, Wiley Online Library, pp. 1734–1748.
[98] Dempere, J., Papakonstantinou, N., O’Halloran, B. M.,
and Van Bossuyt, D. L., 2018. “Risk modeling of variable
probability external initiating events in a functional mod-
eling paradigm”. The Journal of Reliability, Maintainabil-
ity, and Supportability in Systems Engineering, Summer
2018, pp. 5–16.
[99] Van Bossuyt, D. L., O’Halloran, B. M., and Papakon-
stantinou, N., 2019. “A system design method to reduce
cable failure propagation probability in cable bundles”.
The Journal of Reliability, Maintainability, and Supporta-
bility in Systems Engineering, Winter 2018-2019, pp. 5–
12.
[100] OHalloran, B. M., Papakonstantinou, N., and
Van Bossuyt, D. L., 2018. “Assessing the conse-
quence of cyber and physical malicious attacks in
complex, cyber-physical systems during early system
design”. In 2018 IEEE 16th International Conference on
Industrial Informatics (INDIN), IEEE, pp. 733–740.
[101] Coldren, L. O., 1985. “Afghanistan in 1984: the fifth year
of the russo-afghan war”. Asian Survey, 25(2), pp. 169–
179.
[102] Arlitt, R., Van Bossuyt, D. L., Stone, R. B., and Tumer,
I. Y., 2017. “The function-based design for sustainabil-
ity method”. Journal of Mechanical Design, 139(4),
p. 041102.
[103] Arlitt, R., and Van Bossuyt, D. L., 2019. “A generative
human-in-the-loop approach for conceptual design explo-
ration using flow failure frequency in functional models”.
Journal of Computing and Information Science in Engi-
neering.
[104] Kurtoglu, T., and Tumer, I. Y., 2008. “A Graph-Based
Fault Identification and Propagation Framework for Func-
tional Design of Complex Systems”. Journal of Mechan-
ical Design, 130(5), pp. 051401–051401.
[105] O’Halloran, B. M., 2013. “A framework to model reli-
ability and failures in complex systems during the early
engineering design process”.
[106] Ullman, D. G., 2017. The Mechanical Design Process,
6th edition ed. David Ullman LLC.
[107] Taleb, N. N., 2007. The Black Swan: The Impact of the
Highly Improbable. Random House.
[108] Taleb, N. N., 2007. “Black swans and the domains of
statistics”. The American Statistician, 61(3), pp. 198–
200.
[109] WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, LLC, 2004.
AP1000 Probabilistic Risk Assessment, revision 7 ed.
Pittsburgh, PA.
[110] Vikstedt, J., 2010. Radiated spurious emission testing.
[111] Yang, C., McCollum, D., McCarthy, R., and Leighty, W.,
2009. “Meeting an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emis-
sions from transportation by 2050: A case study in cali-
fornia”. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and
Environment, 14(3), pp. 147–156.













aval Postgraduate School user on 20 July 2020
[112] Hardin, G., 1968. “The tragedy of the commons”. science,
162(3859), pp. 1243–1248.
[113] Feeny, D., Berkes, F., McCay, B. J., and Acheson, J. M.,
1990. “The tragedy of the commons: twenty-two years
later”. Human ecology, 18(1), pp. 1–19.
[114] OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, 1982. The
In-Plant Reliability DataBase for Nuclear Power Plant
Components: Data Collection and Methodology Report,
nureg/cr-2641 ed. Washington, DC.
[115] Jeffreys, H., 1998. The Theory of Probability. Oxford
Classic Texts in the Physical Sciences. OUP Oxford.
[116] Shah, J. J., Smith, S. M., and Vargas-Hernandez, N., 2003.
“Metrics for measuring ideation effectiveness”. Design
studies, 24(2), pp. 111–134.
[117] McIntire, M. G., 2016. “From functional modeling to op-
timization: Risk and safety in the design process for large-
scale systems”. PhD thesis, Oregon State University.
[118] Van Bossuyt, D., Hoyle, C., Tumer, I. Y., and Dong, A.,
2012. “Risk attitudes in risk-based design: Considering
risk attitude using utility theory in risk-based design”. Ar-
tificial Intelligence for Engineering Design, Analysis and
Manufacturing, 26(4), p. 393406.
[119] Van Bossuyt, D. L., Dong, A., Tumer, I. Y., and Carvalho,
L., 2013. “On measuring engineering risk attitudes”. Jour-
nal of Mechanical Design, 135(12), p. 121001.













aval Postgraduate School user on 20 July 2020
